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Abstract 
Overprecision—an excessive faith that one knows the truth—is both the most durable and least 
understood form of overconfidence.  This paper offers an approach to the study of overprecision 
that has more in common with the way uncertainty affects our actions in everyday life and avoids 
some methodological problems of other approaches.  We measure the precision in judgment 
implied by people’s tendency to adjust their point estimates of an uncertain quantity in response 
to the costs of over- or underestimating the correct answer.  The results reveal robust 
overprecision.  People adjust their estimates less than they should given their actual knowledge, 
and this is driven by their subjective confidence. 
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A Behavioral Demonstration of Overconfidence in Judgment 
Overconfidence has been called the most pervasive and potent bias to which human 
judgment is vulnerable (De Bondt & Thaler, 1995; Kahneman, 2011).  Of the various ways in 
which overconfidence has been studied, the most robust and least understood is what (Moore & 
Healy, 2008) call overprecision—excessive confidence that one knows the truth.  Overprecision 
has profound consequences, giving investors excessive confidence in how much an investment is 
worth (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 2001), leading physicians to gravitate too quickly 
to a particular diagnosis (Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981), and making us intolerant 
of dissenting views (Harvey, 1997; Harvey & Fischer, 1997). 
Using standard approaches, overprecision has proven remarkably resistant to debiasing 
(Harvey, 1997; Soll & Klayman, 2004).  This has led to concerns that overprecision may be a 
methodological artifact (Dawes & Mulford, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991).  Researchers typically 
study overprecision by asking people to specify 90% confidence intervals around some 
numerical estimate (e.g., the length of the Nile River).  These confidence intervals include the 
truth as rarely as 30% of the time, suggesting people are behaving as if their knowledge was 
more precise than it actually is (McKenzie, Liersch, & Yaniv, 2008; Soll & Klayman, 2004).1  
One criticism of this approach is that it requires familiarity with probability and confidence 
intervals—statistical concepts with which even well-educated people routinely make large errors 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1993). 
A second criticism is that this approach bears little relationship to the way overprecision 
affects people’s judgments in daily life.  It is rare for people to have to specify confidence 
intervals around some belief.  When deciding what time to depart for a lunch meeting, one does 
not consider a 90% confidence interval around the travel time.  Instead, if punctuality is 
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important, then uncertainty should lead one to depart earlier.  Or because falling off a cliff is 
worse than missing the great view, we keep back from the precipice.  Every day, in hundreds of 
different instances, we steer clear of metaphorical cliffs as a function of (1) the cost of erring on 
each side and (2) our uncertainty.  In this paper we manipulate these two factors to observe their 
effects on people’s judgments.  The first benefit of our approach is that it does not require us to 
ask participants about probabilities, degrees of confidence, or confidence intervals.  Second, our 
approach parallels the way in which uncertainty affects judgment every day. 
Our approach builds on that of Mamassian (2008) to test overprecision in declarative 
knowledge.  In our studies, people estimated the high temperature of cities on randomly selected 
days.  We gave them feedback on the accuracy of their estimates and rewarded them for 
accuracy with lottery tickets toward a prize.  The days were divided into three blocks of 24 
judgments each, and each block featured a different payoff function (see Table 1).  One block 
featured symmetric payoffs, in which participants earned lottery tickets if their estimates were 
close to the correct answer.  The two other blocks featured asymmetric payoffs.  In one, 
participants earned lottery tickets only for correctly guessing or overestimating the answer; in the 
other, participants earned lottery tickets only for correctly guessing or underestimating the 
answer.  These payoffs were designed to mimic the asymmetric costs of erring to one side 
encountered in daily life. 
To illustrate, imagine a person whose best guess of the high temperature in Pittsburgh on 
March 10, 2006 is 10°C, but who also believes it could have ranged from 7°C to 12°C.  Under 
symmetric payoffs, in which the costs of over- and underestimation are identical, she should 
guess 10°C.  But because 7°C is also reasonable, she should increase her guess to, say, 13°C (an 
adjustment of +3°C) if she is rewarded only for correctly guessing or overestimating the actual 
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temperature.  At the same time, however, she will only earn two tickets instead of five if she 
overestimates by too much (see Table 1, Block 2).  Thus to maximize earnings, her guess should 
be close to the correct answer but not less.  Note that confidence in one’s knowledge should 
affect the degree to which one adjusts the estimates under asymmetric payoffs.  If, for example, a 
less confident person believes the temperature could have ranged from 5°C to 15°C, he should 
make larger adjustments to his estimates (e.g., +5°C) to maximize his expected earnings. 
We make two predictions about people’s behavior in this task.  First, we expect people to 
be overprecise: They will adjust their point estimates insufficiently.  Experiments 1A and 1B 
demonstrate this basic result.  Second, we expect people’s confidence to moderate their 
overprecision.  Specifically, the more confidence people have in their point estimates, the less 
they will adjust.  We manipulate confidence in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 1A 
Method 
 We recruited 36 women and 28 men from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Mage = 25.6 years) to 
participate in a study of judgment conducted at a local university.  Participants were offered $5 
and lottery tickets towards an iPod Shuffle for completing the study.  Participants first provided 
90% confidence intervals (90% CIs) for the high temperature in Pittsburgh (in °C or °F, at their 
choosing) on 24 randomly-selected days in 2006–2007.  This enabled us to compare traditional 
measures of overprecision with ours.  Following this, participants made point estimates of the 
high temperature for 72 days, divided into three blocks of 24, and received trial-by-trial feedback 
with the correct answers.  Participants earned tickets for the accuracy of their estimates based on 
the payoffs in each block, up to a maximum of 120 per block.  Table 1 explains the payoffs.  The 
block with symmetric payoffs came first, followed by the two blocks with asymmetric payoffs, 
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which were counterbalanced.  Participants then answered questions about their knowledge of 
Pittsburgh temperatures and their demographic characteristics, learned how they did, and were 
dismissed. 
Measures 
We operationalized overprecision in the point estimates as the ratio between the observed 
adjustment of each person’s estimates under asymmetric payoffs and a normative adjustment 
which maximized the expected payoffs in those blocks (cf. Granger, 1969).  The observed 
adjustment for each person was his or her mean error (i.e., bias) in each block of estimates.  We 
expected people to bias their estimates upward when rewarded for overestimating the correct 
answer (i.e., a positive average adjustment in Block 2) and to bias their estimates downward 
when rewarded for underestimating the correct answer (i.e., a negative average adjustment in 
Block 3).  To identify the normative adjustment for each person, we asked a simple question: 
How many more tickets would the participant have earned if he or she had added another X 
degrees to the estimates, on average?  We calculated these amounts for 201 values of X (viz., –
50°C, –49.5°C, …, +49.5°C, +50°C) in each of the asymmetric-payoff blocks.  We then 
averaged those values of X at which the simulated earnings exceeded the participant’s actual 
earnings.  This represented his or her normative adjustment (cf. Lawrence & O'Connor, 2005).2  
Overprecision was indexed by the ratio of each person’s observed adjustment to the 
normative adjustment, subtracted from 1.  If the observed adjustment was less than the normative 
adjustment, overprecision was greater than zero; if the observed adjustment was greater than the 
normative adjustment, overprecision was less than zero—the person was underprecise; and if the 
observed and normative adjustments were equal, overprecision equaled zero—the person was 
neither under- nor overprecise.  For example, if a person’s observed adjustment is +3°C, but he 
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or she would have earned more with an average adjustment of +5°C (see Figure 1), the degree of 
overprecision is .40 (= 1 – 3/5).   
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis.  Two point estimates exceeding 100°C were coded as entry errors 
and excluded prior to the analysis.  To check the manipulation of payoffs, we calculated the 
observed adjustment of each person by block.  Average adjustments (in °C) were 0.69, 95% CI 
[0.25, 1.13], with symmetric payoffs; 4.93, 95% CI [4.35, 5.50], with positive payoffs for 
overestimation; and –6.29, 95% CI [–6.88, –5.70], with positive payoffs for underestimation.  
People adjusted (i.e., biased) their estimates as expected with this manipulation of payoffs. 
 Point estimates.  Because differences between the two blocks with asymmetric payoffs 
were not of substantive interest, we averaged the observed and normative adjustments (reverse-
coded as necessary) across blocks for each person before calculating overprecision.  The average 
level of overprecision was 0.33 (SD = 0.26), t(63) = 10.16, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.27.  
Participants’ actual earnings under asymmetric payoffs (M = 118.69, SD = 12.06) were 
significantly less than what they would have earned absent their overprecision (M = 125.05, SD 
= 8.99), t(63) = 19.49, p < .001, d = 0.60. 
Participants who made larger absolute errors under symmetric payoffs tended to make 
larger adjustments to their point estimates under asymmetric payoffs (rs = .28, p = .024).  In 
other words, those less knowledgeable about Pittsburgh temperatures adjusted more, as they 
should have.  This suggests that confidence—knowledge of what we know (Russo & 
Schoemaker, 1992)—was an important predictor of behavior. 
Confidence intervals.  On average, participants’ 90% CIs contained the correct answer 
49% (SD = 24%) of the time, which replicates prior findings using this method.  There was also 
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correspondence in overprecision across the two methods.  Fifty-four of the 64 participants were 
overprecise in both their confidence intervals and point estimates, seven were overprecise only in 
their confidence intervals, and three were overprecise only in their point estimates.  Individuals 
making the smallest adjustments to their point estimates constructed the narrowest 90% CIs (rs = 
.43, p < .001). 
Experiment 1B 
Presenting the block with symmetric payoffs first in Experiment 1A provided people with 
extensive feedback about their actual knowledge, which enabled them to make informed 
judgments about how to adjust their estimates under asymmetric payoffs.  However, it is possible 
that people found it difficult to switch from making their best estimate of the temperature under 
symmetric payoffs to making biased estimates under asymmetric payoffs.  If so, this would 
overstate the extent of overprecision.  With this concern in mind, Experiment 1B 
counterbalanced the order of the symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. 
Method 
We recruited 60 women and 42 men from Berkeley, California (Mage = 20.7 years) to 
participate.  Each was offered $10 and a chance to win $50 gift cards from an online retailer.  
Participants guessed the high temperature in Berkeley (in °C or °F, at their choosing) on 
randomly chosen days from 2006–2007.  The procedure and measures were identical to that of 
the prior experiment with two exceptions.  First, we counterbalanced the order of the symmetric 
and asymmetric payoffs.  Second, participants completed the 90% CIs after their point estimates.   
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Results and Discussion 
Average adjustments (in °C) were –1.09, 95% CI [–1.34, –0.84], with symmetric payoffs; 
2.79, 95% CI [2.46, 3.12], with positive payoffs for overestimation; and –2.84, 95% CI [–3.12, –
2.57], with positive payoffs for underestimation. 
 The average level of overprecision was 0.40 (SD = 0.26), t(101) = 15.82, p < .001, d = 
1.57.  Overprecision was marginally higher for the 53 participants who started with the 
asymmetric payoffs (M = 0.45, SD = 0.26) than for the 49 participants who started with the 
symmetric payoffs (M = 0.36, SD = 0.25), t(100) = 1.70, p = .092, d = 0.34.  This suggests that 
presenting the symmetric payoffs first, if anything, produced less overprecision.  
Confidence intervals.  On average, participants’ 90% CIs contained the correct answer 
70% (SD = 18%) of the time.  As in the prior study, individuals making the smallest adjustments 
to their point estimates constructed the narrowest 90% CIs (rs = .38, p < .001). Of the 102 
participants, 75 were overprecise in both their confidence intervals and point estimates, eight 
were overprecise only in their confidence intervals, 18 were overprecise only in their point 
estimates, and one was overprecise in neither task. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiments 1A and 1B produced strong evidence of overprecision in judgments.  
Experiment 2 demonstrates that confidence moderates people’s point-estimate adjustments.  We 
manipulated confidence directly by varying the feedback participants received (cf. Arkes, 
Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987; Stone & Opel, 2000).  Specifically, participants received no 
trial-by-trial feedback about their accuracy, authentic feedback (as in the prior experiments), or 
exaggerated feedback.  For those in the no-feedback and authentic-feedback conditions, we 
expected to replicate the overprecision found in the first experiments.  We expected those 
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receiving exaggerated feedback to show the least overprecision. 
Method 
We recruited 107 women and 77 men from Berkeley, California (Mage = 20.5 years) to 
participate.  Each was offered $10 and a chance to win $25 gift cards from an online retailer.  
The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 1A with two exceptions.  First, after 
specifying their 90% CIs, participants were assigned to one of three conditions for the point 
estimates.  In the no-feedback condition, participants completed their point estimates without 
trial-level or summary feedback about their errors; in the authentic-feedback condition, 
participants received accurate trial-level feedback about their errors; and in the exaggerated-
feedback condition, participants received manufactured trial-level feedback about their errors.  
The exaggerated feedback told participants their errors were approximately 2.5 times greater 
than they actually were (e.g., if the actual error was +2°C, the feedback was +5°C).  We selected 
this exaggeration after estimating what feedback might have optimized accuracy in Experiments 
1A and 1B.  
Second, after making their point estimates under symmetric payoffs, all participants 
provided subjective probability distributions of their errors based on the SPIES technique 
(Haran, Moore, & Morewedge, 2010).  They indicated, for every 100 temperature estimates, how 
many of their errors would fall into each of nine intervals (viz., < –11°C, –10 to –8°C,…, +8 to 
+10°C, > +11°C).  After assigning frequencies to each interval, participants completed their 
point estimates under asymmetric payoffs.  Participants then answered questions about their 
understanding of the task, their motivation, and their confidence, after which they learned their 
performance and were dismissed. 
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Measures 
 Overprecision was operationalized as in the prior experiments.  We collected two 
measures of participants’ confidence.  The implicit measure was the subjective probability 
distribution of their errors provided after the first block of point estimates.  We expected 
participants with less confidence to construct wider probability distributions (as measured by the 
standard deviation of their distributions) than those with more confidence (Haran, et al., 2010).  
The explicit measure of confidence was each person’s answer to the following question collected 
at the end of the study: “How confident are you in your ability to accurately estimate Berkeley, 
CA temperatures?” (0 = Not at all confident, 4 = Extremely confident). 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis. Four estimates exceeding 100°C in absolute value were dropped 
as entry errors prior to analysis.  In addition, three participants who made constant and extreme 
estimates (for Berkeley, CA) under asymmetric payoffs (e.g., –18°C) were excluded from the 
analysis, leaving a final sample of 181.3  
Average adjustments (in °C) were –0.29, 95% CI [–0.47, –0.10], with symmetric payoffs; 
3.78, 95% CI [3.40, 4.15], with positive payoffs for overestimation; and –3.21, 95% CI [–3.63, –
2.80], with positive payoffs for underestimation.  
Confidence.  The correlation between the two measures of confidence was –.41 (i.e., 
people with wider probability distributions also reported lower confidence).  A multivariate 
omnibus test rejected that feedback had no effect on confidence, F(4, 178) = 13.20, p < .001.  As 
Table 2 indicates, for both the subjective probability distributions, F(2, 178) = 16.33, p < .001, η2 
= .15, and self-reported confidence,  F(2, 178) = 18.28, p < .001, η2 = .17, participants in the no-
feedback condition were most confident (i.e., had the narrowest probability distributions), 
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followed by those in the authentic-feedback condition, followed by those in the exaggerated-
feedback condition. 
Point estimates.  The average level of overprecision was .29 (SD = .48), t(180) = 8.31, p 
< .001, d = 0.62.  Participants’ total earnings under asymmetric payoffs (M = 116.40, SD = 
18.77) were significantly less than what they would have earned absent their overprecision (M = 
128.86, SD = 12.35), t(180) = 17.81, p < .001, d = 0.79. 
As expected, we reduced overprecision by manipulating confidence.  Table 2 indicates 
that participants receiving exaggerated feedback were significantly less overprecise than those 
receiving either no feedback, t(178) = 3.91, p < .001, d = 0.59, or authentic feedback, t(178) = 
4.95, p < .001, d  = 0.74.  In fact, overprecision in the exaggerated-feedback condition did not 
differ statistically from zero, t(58) = 0.72, p = .47, d = 0.09.  
People display overprecision in this task because they insufficiently adjust their point 
estimates relative to their normative benchmarks—they step too close to the cliff’s edge.  We 
have argued these adjustments are affected by confidence: People who are less confident in their 
expertise adjust more than people who are more confident.  The data supported this claim.  
Participants with wider subjective probability distributions made larger adjustments to their 
subsequent point estimates (r = .37, p < .001) and were less overprecise (r = –.28, p < .001).   
Confidence intervals.  On average, participants’ 90% CIs contained the true answer 63% 
(SD = 22%) of the time.  This overprecision did not differ by condition, F(2, 178) = 0.91, p = 
.405.  Individuals making the smallest adjustments to their point estimates constructed the 
narrowest 90% CIs (rs = .18, p = .018).  Of the 181 participants, 121 were overprecise in both 
their confidence intervals and point estimates, 37 were overprecise only in their confidence 
intervals, 17 were overprecise only in their point estimates, and six were overprecise in neither 
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task.   
Discussion 
The three experiments we report present evidence of overprecision in judgment using a 
behavioral measure that (1) does not require an understanding of probabilities or confidence 
intervals by research participants and (2) bears more similarity to the everyday decision contexts 
that depend on confidence in judgment.  The results suggest that overprecision is robust and is 
not solely a product of unfamiliar elicitation methods (such as confidence intervals) that assume 
too much about respondents’ statistical sophistication. 
Yet two concerns persist.  First, participants may have simply been insensitive to the 
asymmetric payoffs.  Anticipating this, we took measures to ensure participants understood the 
task: They had to correctly answer three questions about the payoffs to demonstrate their 
attention and understanding before starting each block, and the payoff function was summarized 
at the top of the computer screen throughout the trials.  Moreover, as reported above, participants 
biased their estimates in the appropriate direction, and did so, on average, on the first trial of 
each block.  In short, participants understood their incentives (for additional evidence about 
people's ability to respond to asymmetric payoffs, see Goodwin, 2005; Lawrence & O'Connor, 
2005; Weber, 1994). 
Second, even if they understood their payoffs, participants may have insufficiently 
adjusted their estimates because they were anchored by their best estimate of the answer (Block 
& Harper, 1991).  In fact, verbal protocols from a supplementary study confirmed that they often 
started with a best guess and adjusted from there.  However, while anchoring processes may 
have been at work, they cannot explain why (a) those with less expertise made greater 
adjustments in Experiment 1A, (b) those with less confidence made greater adjustments in 
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Experiment 2, and (c) overprecision was eliminated in Experiment 2 when people received 
unflattering feedback about their accuracy.  In sum, when asymmetric incentives lead people to 
adjust their responses to one side or to the other of the best guess, the amount of adjustment 
depends critically on how confident people are in the accuracy of their knowledge—the 
subjective precision in their judgment.  Excessive confidence is therefore key to participants’ 
failure to adjust sufficiently. 
The new method we present has its limitations.  It does not elicit direct measures of 
confidence, and it is pedagogically less useful than traditional means of illustrating 
overconfidence, such as confidence-interval estimation (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992).  
Nevertheless, it offers researchers an alternative to self-reports which rely on having to explain 
probabilities or confidence intervals.   
The consequence of all this overprecision is profound.  It happens with some frequency 
that people cut things too close—arriving late, missing planes, bouncing checks, or falling off 
one of the many cliffs that present themselves to us in our daily lives.  People also cling too 
fervently to beliefs that are poorly supported by evidence, adjusting their beliefs too little in light 
of the evidence or the consequences of being wrong.  We hope that the methodology and the 
evidence we present here will prove useful in elucidating the underlying sources of this excessive 
faith in the accuracy of our own judgment.  
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Footnotes 
1 Elicitation methods that call explicit attention to a large range of outcomes can reduce 
overprecision (see Haran, et al., 2010; Winman, Hansson, & Juslin, 2004), and, in some cases, 
even cause underprecision (Bolger & Harvey, 1995; Goodwin, 2005). 
2 We relied on each person’s empirical distribution of errors for each payoff function to 
identify his or her normative adjustment rather than make parametric assumptions about those 
distributions, such as normality or invariance across payoff functions.  As one reviewer pointed 
out, however, our method does assume that the distributions would not otherwise materially 
change if people made smaller or larger adjustments.  We used data from Experiment 1B to 
investigate this.  First, p-values provided by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the 
distribution of errors between payoff functions for each person ranged from .14 to 1.00.  Thus 
aside from their obvious differences in location, these error distributions were statistically 
equivalent (at an alpha of .10) across payoff functions.  Second, we assessed whether any 
differences in these error distributions, as indexed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic D, 
were related to differences in participants’ observed adjustments for each payoff function.  This 
correlation was 0.15 (p = .146).  In sum, differences between the error distributions across 
asymmetric payoff functions were minor and weakly related to differences in the observed 
adjustments. 
3 These three participants also reported significantly less motivation, F(1, 182) = 3.64, p 
= .058, and spent significantly less time on the task, F(1, 183) = 8.16, p = .005, than the other 
participants.
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Table 1  
Number of Lottery Tickets Earned, as a Function of Accuracy 
  Estimate (relative to actual temperature) 
Block Payoff 
More 
than 6°C 
below 
6 to 0°C 
below 
0 to 6°C 
above 
More 
than 6°C 
above 
1 Equal reward for 
positive and negative 
errors 
0 5 5 0 
2 No reward for negative 
errors; reward for 
positive errors 
0 0 5 2 
3 No reward for positive 
errors; reward for 
negative errors 
2 5 0 0 
Note. Perfect estimates always earned five tickets.  Because temperatures are less variable in 
Berkeley than in Pittsburgh, we reduced the cutoff from 6°C to 4°C in Experiments 1B and 2. 
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Table 2 
Effects of Feedback on Beliefs and Overprecision in Experiment 2 
  Beliefs  Adjustments  
Condition n 
SD  
of SPD 
Self-reported 
confidence  Observed Normative 
Over-
precision 
No 
feedback 
64 1.61 
(0.56) 
2.16 
(0.93) 
 
2.79 
(1.88) 
5.02 
(1.47) 
0.41 
(0.51) 
Authentic 
feedback 
58 1.70 
(0.43) 
2.05 
(0.91) 
 
2.74 
(1.07) 
5.14 
(1.52) 
0.42 
(0.28) 
Exaggerated 
feedback 
59 2.08 
(0.46) 
1.24 
(0.90) 
 
5.00 
(2.66) 
5.71 
(1.70) 
0.05 
(0.51) 
Overall 181 1.79 
(0.53) 
1.82 
(1.00) 
 3.50 
(2.23) 
5.28 
(1.59) 
0.29 
(0.48) 
Note.  Means reported with standard deviations in parentheses.  SPD = Subjective probability 
distribution. 
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Figure 1. A stylized representation of overprecision in judgment.  The solid line plots a 
hypothetical person’s observed distribution of errors in response to payoffs which reward 
overestimation; on average this person added +3 to her estimates.  The double line identifies the 
average adjustment which maximizes her expected payoffs, which in this case is +5.  The percent 
difference between the observed and normative adjustments represents overprecision.  The 
dashed line plots the person’s belief about her errors implied by the observed adjustment.  (Note, 
we do not assume normality when calculating overprecision.) 
 
 
